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1 Introduction
Milton Friedman (1970): "There is one and only one social responsibility of
business - to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its
pro…ts so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages
in open and free competition without deception or fraud".
The above widely cited argument by Milton Friedman and echoed by the
recent issue of Economist (2005) apparently is based on the concern that a …rm
spending its money ine¢ciently will ultimately make a loss and is driven out of
business. Our paper critically evaluates such a concern. The stated normative
argument has the ‡avor that it is developed from the perspective of a …rm
which is rather autonomous and immune to social norms and people’s moral
sentiments. The principle it suggests appears to be developed in the …ctitious
neoclassical world with perfect markets and with no links to ethical values.
Instead, the current paper builds a world where consumers not only care for the
products but also for how they are produced. We ask to what extent and under
what conditions consumers equipped with moral preferences are able to control
…rms’ strategy choices, whether there are markets for morality in the sense that
moral principles can be priced in markets, and whether consumers’ values can
steer corporate cultures and their success.
Such issues arise particularly in a context where the products of di¤erent
producers are rather homogeneous by quality and where the corporate image,
i.e. the quality of the corporate culture, therefore tends to play an important role
in guiding consumers’ choices. Take a few examples. Today, consumers can buy
in a grocery two types of co¤ee, say. One type is the regular co¤ee. The other
type, call it a fair trade co¤ee, is a perfect substitute but is more expensive
because the …rm (delivery chain) commits to a higher cost guaranteeing the
original producer a fair compensation. Firms selling the fair trade co¤ee have a
better image than the …rms selling only regular co¤ee. Other examples include a
commitment to produce agricultural products without chemical fertilizers. Or,
a mother company can provide an e¤ort to control for the employment of child
labor by its foreign subsidiaries. Cases where consumers characterized by moral
preferences punish …rms behaving badly are numerous.
Building up a corporate culture with a code for an ethical conduct typically
is costly. It represents a commitment strategy which distances from the temp-
tation to take an advantage of some short-term pro…table opportunism at the
expense of some stakeholders. The idea of costly corporate culture is in line
with empirical observations on how much money …rms spend on their image
in mass media. In their internet home pages, they advertise their charity and
…nancing of social projects which have nothing to do with their core business
areas. We consider the question whether the …rms with a costly ethical conduct
can survive. We also consider the case where the …rm’s commitment cannot
be perfectly monitored. The image building is subject to moral hazard when
the investment is not fully transparent. Consumers …lter market information,
update their estimates of the …rms’ images but they do not observe the true
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corporate culture if information is asymmetric. Window dressing causes signal
jamming. For example, the Enron company was known for its strong princi-
ples. Yet, it cheated all of its stakeholders. Several other corporate scandals
were revealed in the US in 2002, including Worldcom, Merck and AOL Time
Warner. Also the Finnish paper producer, UPM-Kymmene was known for its
high-quality principles. Its image was sound. Yet, it turned out to be a partner
in a secret price cartel.
The paper takes the view that commitment to social responsibility is a costly
strategy but one which strengthens social norms in the society. It operates like
a positive externality. Firms’ image may also be hurt by its policy relative to
its stakeholders. We raise the question whether markets provide a disciplinary
mechanism for corporate strategies also in their employment policy.
It has been argued by Shleifer (2004) that erosion of corporate ethics may
result from intensi…ed competition instead of greed. It is the competition which
reduces …rms’ willingness to pay for ethical conduct, because competition drives
down prices and entrepreneurs’ incomes.1 An opposite view is taken by Hörner
(2002) who claims that markets’ response in terms of reputation helps to main-
tain corporate ethics.
Capitalism has created more wealth and prosperity than any other economic
system. The degree of trust in capitalist economies is substantial, going far
beyond that of, say almost any other known economic and social systems. How-
ever, some of its mechanisms and outcomes are regarded unfair in the com-
mon opinion. Capitalist economic systems indeed are characterized by di¤erent
faces, like Janus, the Roman god of gates and doors, beginnings and endings,
and hence represented with a double-faced head, it looks in opposite directions.
On the other hand, the complexity of transactions, markets and contracts has
opened a variety of new avenues to exploit the opportunities. Consequently,
discussion about corporate culture and corporate social responsibility is topical.
Enhanced global competition adds to its relevance. Increased information dis-
semination via TV and internet helps to judge economic cultures in trade but
the informational barriers are never fully overcome.
As suggested by Frank (2004) there are several mechanisms whereby a …rm
that incurs additional costs going beyond what is required by law is nonetheless
able to prosper in competition with more opportunistic rivals. The mechanisms
discussed by Frank operate against exploitation of short-run bene…ts, facilitating
longer-term repeated interactions and survival of commitment to rules. With
the rise of globalization, the restructuring of corporations, labor …rings, and
environmental problems, Frank’s analysis provides a di¤erent answer to the
challenging issue of corporate social responsibility.
It is, however, not a trivial matter to extend such an analysis to the area
of appropriate incentive schemes for corporate managers. Tirole (2001) has
convincingly argued that such schemes, when linked to the welfare of various
stakeholders, probably would ruin the economic life of corporations. There is
1Nonetheless, given that ethical conduct is a normal good, it is suggested by Shleifer (2004)
that competition tends to be good for ethical norms in the long run, because competition
promotes income growth.
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evidence for that building better relations with primary shareholders leads to
improved shareholder value, while social issue participation is negatively asso-
ciated with shareholder value, see Hillman and Keim (2001).
We contribute in terms of consumer power.2 It is increasingly recognized
among economists that the homo oeconomicus cannot be a complete description
of a human being. The other side of the coin is the homo moralis living in us.
People take strong positions relative to fairness (Frank (2004)). Moral feelings
enter their preferences (Hausman and McPehrson (1993)). Homo moralis does
not only look into market prices but may be sensitive to immorality, cheating
and unfair actions. One of the key aspects is that market processes do not
operate through prices and quality only, but also through the beliefs on quality
and corporate culture. Corporate image is an important element determining
the consumer loyalty and willingness to pay (Hörner (2002)). When products
are similar, the image of the producing …rm tends to have a greater impact on
consumers’ choices. This also makes advertisement an important instrument in
corporate strategy choice.
The current paper takes the view that business survival is indeed subject
to Darwinist evolutionary processes which harshly punish unpro…table …rms. It
examines the e¤ects of a move from less competition to more intense competi-
tion. Two …rms operate in the market. At the …rst stage, …rms choose their
ethical code. At the second stage, a competitive process occurs. The paper asks
whether markets can provide a disciplinary control mechanism for …rms. In
particular, it addresses the issue whether high-quality corporate culture can rep-
resent a competitive advantage instead of a competitive disadvantage. With ho-
mogeneous products, increased competition emphasizes the role of image build-
ing in business survival. The paper derives conditions for equilibria where the
code of ethical conduct of …rms is dominating, diverse or non-existent. Some-
what counterintuitively, ethical conduct may imply a prisoners’ dilemma under
Cournot output competition though not under price competition. Disappearing
transparency shakes the image of …rms but need not reduce social capital. The
working conditions of labor need not deteriorate when consumers pay due at-
tention to the …rms’ image. The question of socially optimal corporate culture
is discussed.
The paper is structured as follows. Sections 2-4 introduce our model with
concumers having heterogenous code of ethical conduct and we discuss the po-
tential market equilibria when …rms can choose their ethical conduct. The
e¤ects of disappearing transparency are examined in Section 5. The link be-
tween worker externality and markets’ reactions is examined in Section 6 and
the socially optimal corporate culture in Section 7. The …nal section concludes.
2We would like to highlight the work by John Ruskin (1819-1900), an English critic and
social theorist who not only revolutionized art history but proposed a positive program for
social reform He was an early writer on the quality of labour in his Unto This Last (1962). He
was one of the …rst to propose that consumers’ values can have an impact on how production
and the input of labor is organized. The authors are grateful to Manfred J. Holler for pointing
out this historical reference.
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2 Model
We consider imperfect competition in the vertical product di¤erentiation model
introduced by Mussa and Rosen (1978). The model is also related to the classic
Brander and Spencer (2003) approach on R&D competition.This framework is
particularly appropriate as entry is a secondary issue in the current context.
There are two …rms a and b. They produce products which are perfect substi-
tutes for the consumers in terms of their physical characteristics. The choice
of status of a …rm with a code of high ethical conduct is costly, requiring an
investment k > 0: In most of what follows, the investment k is assumed to be
a credible signal to the consumers of the …rm’s type. We motivate the cost
of ethical conduct as follows. A choice by the …rm of its corporate culture is
viewed to represent a long-term commitment whereby the …rm abstains from
short-term pro…table opportunism arising probabilistically and leading to access
of with short-sighted gains. Thus the cost of status can be presented as k = ®s
where 0 < ® < 1 is the probability of a short-term gain, s.3
We assume in most of what follows that the …rm a is the low-cost …rm while
the …rm b is the high-cost …rm, ka < kb: Occasionally, we assume that both
face same costs, ka = kb: Firms choose their type ex ante. They may target
the image of a …rm with a code of ethical conduct or, alternatively, a …rm with
no ethical code. We characterize the …rst …rm as type H-…rm and the second
as type L-…rm. As the ethical codes chosen by the …rms are denoted by H; L;
pro…ts are thus presented as ¼HLa ; ¼
HL
b if …rm a chooses to have the ethical
code while …rm b does not. The structure of market equilibrium may have both
…rms having the ethical conduct (HH), having one …rm with it and one with
no ethical conduct (HL), or having two …rms with low ethical conduct (LL).
The case where …rms do not commit to their announced type, will be discussed
later in the paper.
The mass of consumers is scaled to one. Each consumer buys at most one
unit of the good. Consumers are indexed by x²[0; 1] with respect to their basic
willingness to pay in decreasing order. Consumer x = 0 is endowed with the
highest willingness to pay, ¯0; consumer x = 1 has a zero willingness to pay. The
willingness to pay by the rest of consumes is uniformly distributed on (0; ¯0) :
Consumers also value the producers’ image. They are heterogeneous in that
regard. If a …rm adopts the code of ethical conduct, the consumers’ willingness
to pay for its product is greater and is assumed to be uniformly distributed on
(0; ¯1), ¯1 > ¯0 > 0: We assume that the ratio between the valuations is equal
across consumers. This implies that a consumer with low basic willingness to
pay for the product also values little the image of the producer.4 In a sense,
the degree of self-respect of consumers is related to the di¤erence ¯1 ¡ ¯0. Our
approach is a formalization of the sociological theory of self-esteem. Cf. Franks
and Marolla (1976) who conceptualize self-esteem in terms of the individual’s
3 It is not the case that altruism will always represent a costly sacri…ce. Frank (1987) has
argued that the ability to commit to cooperation results in mutual gains.
4The model can be extended to the case where the consumers’ valuation is related to the
investment, k; undertaken by the …rm.
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feelings derived from his own perceptions and appraisals of signi…cant others
in the form of social approval. We notice, however, that there is nothing in
the model which would guarantee that the consumers’ values were universally
acceptable. We recognize that it remains an open issue whether we can trust
on markets in formation of values.
In the current section, we assume that the consumers are able to identify
the type of the …rm. They have the power of punishing the …rm having chosen
no ethical conduct by committing to pay a price premium on the product of the
…rm with a high ethical conduct. In the spirit of Katz and Shapiro (1985) and
Shy (2001, p. 20), we consider equilibria in which consumers’ expectations are
ful…lled.
Using our assumptions, the consumers can be ordered along a declining linear
demand curve. Denoting the net utilities (indirect utilities) from the product
of the H¡…rm and of the L¡…rm, respectively, by ui; vj for consumers (xi; xj);
we have
ui = ¯1(1 ¡ xi) ¡ pH ; vj = ¯0(1 ¡ xj) ¡ pL; ¯1 > ¯0 > 0: (1)
where pH ; pL are the prices (yet to be determined).
In a sense, all consumers in our model ex ante prefer the ethical …rm over
the non-ethical one though to a varying degree. They are all entitled to a higher
utility when buying at the H¡…rm. However, their actual decision is a¤ected
not only by their preferences but also by the market prices. The consumer loses
the extra self-respect open to her if she buys the product of the …rm with no
ethical conduct.
The time line of the model is as follows. There are two stages. Before the
market game opens, …rms undertake in stage one, a cost-bene…t analysis of their
desired type. At stage two, …rms compete for customers in the market place
and their pro…ts are realized.
If k is the same for both …rms, the market equilibrium can apparently be
expected to be of two types: either both …rms become an H¡…rm, or both
become an L¡…rm. We, however, suggest that also a mixed equilibrium can
arise. An equilibrium with both types can arise particularly if the costs of
investment di¤er. The model is solved backwards as we look for the sub-game
perfect Nash equilibrium. In this section, we consider the potential equilibria
in stage two. Then we resume to the stage one to analyze whether the resulting
outcome can be of the prisoners’ dilemma type.
2.1 Potential Equilibria
Market equilibrium with two types of producers. Suppose that we have
an equilibrium with two types of …rms, one of H¡type and one of L¡type.5
Their pro…ts, respectively, are
¼HLa = pHxH ¡ ka; ¼HLb = pLxL; (2)
5We notice that also the entrepreneur can have self-respect, implying that k could be
interpreted as the net cost of adopting the code of ethical conduct.
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as the …rm lacking the ethical conduct does not incur the extra cost. The
outcome is asymmetric and consumers are segmented.
There are two marginal consumers. We identify by xm the marginal con-
sumer who is indi¤erent between buying the product of the H¡ and L¡…rm,
and by xn the marginal consumer who is indi¤erent between buying the product
of the L¡…rm and none: We expect that in the industry equilibrium, there will
be segmentation of markets, i.e. those consumers with a high marginal utility
(willingness to pay) will buy from the H¡…rm while those with lower marginal
utility buy from the L¡…rm. The consumers are found on the declining demand
curve. Thus the marginal utility for a consumer, xi, buying from the H¡…rm is
¯1(1 ¡xi) where 0 · i · m: The marginal utility for consumer xj , buying from
the L¡…rm is ¯0(1 ¡ xj) where m · j · n: Subtracting the prices, it holds for
the marginal consumers,
¯1(1 ¡ xm) ¡ pH = ¯0(1 ¡ xm) ¡ pL; ¯0(1 ¡ (xm + xn)) ¡ pL = 0:
As negative prices are excluded (…rms cannot make negative pro…ts), it fol-
lows that 0 · xm + xn · 1; 0 · xm · 1; 0 · xn · 1: The market prices then
satisfy
pL = ¯0(1 ¡ (xm + xn)); pH = ¯1(1 ¡ xm) ¡ ¯0xn:
Therefore, the price of the H¡…rm thus exceeds the price in the L¡…rm,
pH ¡pL = (¯1 ¡ ¯0) (1¡xm): Note that the number of buyers from the H¡…rm
and L¡…rm, respectively, are xH = xm; xL = xn:
The pro…ts are
¼HLa = [¯1(1 ¡ xm) ¡ ¯0xn]xm ¡ ka; ¼HLb = ¯0(1 ¡ (xm + xn))xn:
Suppose that the participation constraints ¼Ha ¸ 0, ¼Lb ¸ 0 are satis…ed requiring
ka · [¯1(1 ¡ xm) ¡ ¯0xn]xm. Consider the Cournot-Nash equilibrium obtained
from reaction functions
xm =
¯1 ¡ ¯0xn
2¯1
; xn =
1 ¡ xm
2
:
The market shares are
xm =
2¯1 ¡ ¯0
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
> xn =
¯1
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
: (3)
Prices can be solved as
pH =
¯1(2¯1 ¡ ¯0)
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
> pL =
¯1¯0
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
: (4)
Several results are at hand. In particular, there is a price premium on the
product of the …rm with a code of high ethical conduct,
pH ¡ pL = 2¯1(¯1 ¡ ¯0)
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
> 0:
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The …rm with an ethical code is able to take an advantage of those consumers
who pay attention to its image. From another angle, consumer morality is
priced in the market. Moreover, the ethical …rm also has a greater market
share, xm > xn: Its market share is positively related to the consumers’ ethical
aspiration while the market share of its rival is a¤ected adversely, @xm=@¯1 >
0; @xn=@¯1 < 0:
When both …rms are in the market and we have a mixed equilibrium, the
pro…ts are
¼HLa = ¯1
µ
2¯1 ¡ ¯0
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
¶2
¡ ka; ¼HLb = ¯0
µ
¯1
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
¶2
:
To constitute a market equilibrium and given the strategy of the othern …rm,
neither …rm can increase its pro…t by switching to the role of its rival. Those
conditions will be considered below.
We notice that there is a special case where a mixed equilibrium arises even
when ka = kb = k: When k = ¯1
³
2¯1¡¯0
4¯1¡¯0
´2
¡ ¯0
³
¯1
4¯1¡¯0
´2
we …nd that …rms
are indi¤erent between their roles in the market as long as they adopt di¤erent
roles.
Market equilibrium with both …rms having the ethical conduct. We
next consider the case where it is su¢ciently inexpensive for both …rms, …rm
a and …rm b have adopted the ethical conduct, yet ka < kb.6 This means
that …rms operate as a symmetric duopoly. We consider a Cournot game.7
Consumers face two equivalent products. The marginal consumer, this time
say xn; again faces a condition that his net utility is zero, as his alternative is
to abstain from consumption. There can be only one market price, say p; in
equilibrium.
It holds for the marginal consumer
¯1(1 ¡ (xa + xb)) ¡ p = 0
The pro…ts are
¼HHa = [¯1(1 ¡ (xa + xb))]xa ¡ ka; ¼HHb = [¯1(1 ¡ (xa + xb))]xb ¡ kb
and the outputs can be solved as
xa =
1
3
= xb: (5)
Solving for the market price
p =
1
3
¯1; (6)
6 In the section below, we consider the case where both …rms will have an ethical code
because of prisoners’ dilemma.
7Bertrand price competition would ruin …rms pro…ts though both …rms may survive. We
consider this case in the sequel.
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we …nd an interesting outcome. When both …rms have adopted the ethical code,
the ethical aspiration of consumers does not have any impact on how many
consumers actually buy. Consumers’ ethical preferences are fully capitalized in
the market price; the …rms exploit the consumers’ willingness to pay for their
ethical image and the pro…t levels satisfy
¼HHa =
1
9
¯1 ¡ ka; ¼HHb =
1
9
¯1 ¡ kb:
A necessary (but not su¢cient) condition for the case HH to constitute a
market equilibrium is that
kb · 1
9
¯1:
If this condition is satis…ed, we can have two …rms with an ethical code and
still making pro…t. We also notice that when both …rms can commit to an ethical
conduct, all consumers pay a lower price than paid by the buyers of the …rm with
an ethical conduct in the case of mixed equilibrium since pH =
¯1(2¯1¡¯0)
4¯1¡¯0 >
1
3¯1
for all ¯1 > ¯0:
Market equilibrium when neither …rm has ethical conduct. When
consumers pay no premium on the ethical code, the price is determined from
¯0(1 ¡ (xa + xb)) ¡ p = 0:
This time pro…ts are ¼LLa = [¯0(1 ¡ (xa + xb))]xa; ¼LLb = [¯0(1 ¡ (xa + xb))]xb:
Again outputs and the market price are xa = 13 = xb; p =
1
3¯0: Thus, pro…ts
¼LLa = ¼
LL
b =
1
9¯0 are lower than in the previous case.
3 To Be or Not to Be?
So far, the industrial structure was taken as given. In the initial stage, …rms
rationally anticipate the market outcome and make the choice of their ethical
conduct. A priori, it is possible that no …rm wants to have an ethical conduct,
one …rm wants while the other does not, or both want. The outcome depends
on the …rm-speci…c cost of adopting such a code and the consumers’ aspirations.
We ask whether competition for customers can imply a prisoners’ dilemma: if
one adopts the code, it is better for the other one to follow, even if both end up
having a lower pro…t?
We …rst summarize the above …ndings on pro…ts under di¤erent industrial
structures:
HH : ¼HHa =
1
9
¯1 ¡ ka; ¼HHb =
1
9
¯1 ¡ kb
HL : ¼HLa = ¯1
µ
2¯1 ¡ ¯0
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
¶2
¡ ka; ¼HLb = ¯0
µ
¯1
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
¶2
(7)
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LL : ¼LLa = ¼
LL
b =
1
9
¯0:
Our task is to …nd out the conditions as to what strategy combination
can possibly represent an equilibrium. Mixed strategies are excluded as the
k-investment is assumed to be observable. The a priori intuition is that HH
can arise if ka; kb are small while LL is expected to arise if ka; kb are large. How-
ever, one has to be careful with intuition as …rms’ production choices determine
their pro…tability and thereby interact with their ethical code. Our approach is
to start with the LL¡case and ask whether it is pro…table to switch from LL to
HH or HL:
In LL; pro…ts are ¼LLa = ¼
LL
b =
1
9¯0: Suppose that one of the …rms is a
candidate to be of H¡type. It has an incentive to switch its type while the
other …rm stays as a …rm of L¡type if the following two conditions are met
¼HLa = ¯1
µ
2¯1 ¡ ¯0
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
¶2
¡ ka > 1
9
¯0 => ka < ¯1
µ
2¯1 ¡ ¯0
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
¶2
¡ 1
9
¯0
¼HLb = ¯0
µ
¯1
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
¶2
>
1
9
¯1 ¡ kb => kb >
1
9
¯1 ¡ ¯0
µ
¯1
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
¶2
:
The additional requirement is that ka < kb: These are the necessary and su¢-
cient conditions for a mixed (H; L)¡equilibrium. To establish that a mixed
equilibrium is possible, it is su¢cient to produce just one example. Take
¯0 = 1; ¯1 = 2: Having ka <
113
441 and kb >
113
441 satisfy all three stated con-
ditions.
Consider next the conditions for the case where both …rms have an incentive
to switch to an H¡type. These conditions are
¼HHa =
1
9
¯1 ¡ ka >
1
9
¯0 => ka <
¯1 ¡ ¯0
9
¼HHb =
1
9
¯1 ¡ kb >
1
9
¯0 => kb <
¯1 ¡ ¯0
9
:
When these conditions are satis…ed, we have an equilibrium with two …rms with
an ethical code.
To summarize, …rms’ choice of their code of ethical conduct depends both
on the cost of the code and on consumers’ valuation. In particular, conditions
were expressed as to when a mixed equilibrium exists and when the case with
both …rms having ethical conduct will arise.8
8The idea of …rms having di¤erent ethical codes comes close to the issue of quality. From
the literature on the quality choice, see Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Motta (1993), it is
known that …rms tend to di¤erentiate their products (even when costs of quality are zero).
This incentive arises because product di¤erentiation allows …rms to relax price competition on
the market. Viewed our model from that angle, a mixed equilibrium with output competition
appears to represent a relevant candidate for a description of industries where consumers are
strictly heterogenous with respect to their ethical aspirations.
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3.1 Multiple Equilibria: Ethical Code and Prisoners’ Dilemma
We now see that the game of ethics can have multiple equilibria. Suppose
that the costs of investment ka; kb are high enough that both …rms make a
larger pro…t if they abstain from making the investment. Suppose, however,
that when …rm b adopts the no-investment strategy, …rm a can increase its
pro…ts by investing and the …rm b makes a loss. Firm b rationally anticipating
such an incentive of the a¡…rm may therefore not commit to the no-investment
strategy; both end up thus choosing the ethical code. If it results in a lower
level of pro…ts for both …rms, we have prisoners’ dilemma. However, both …rms
understand that the L¡strategy gives to both of them a greater pro…t than the
H¡strategy when adopted jointly. If both have a strong reason to believe that
neither will play the H¡strategy, the equilibrium outcome is LL: However, if the
expectations are such that nothing prevents a …rm from leapfrogging the rival,
we must have HH as an equilibrium. Expectations on whether the competitor
can commit are thus critical.
Prisoners’ dilemma thus arises (i) if a switch of one …rm induces also the
second …rm to switch conditional on that both …rms are better o¤ if they co-
ordinate their choices and neither switches (ii) both …rms have an incentive to
switch provided that the other one does not. Then the switch is the dominating
strategy.
Conditions for prisoners’ dilemma to arise are
¼HHa =
1
9
¯1 ¡ ka <
1
9
¯0 = ¼
LL
a
¼HHb =
1
9
¯1 ¡ kb <
1
9
¯0 = ¼
LL
b
¼HLa = ¯1
µ
2¯1 ¡ ¯0
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
¶2
¡ ka > 1
9
¯0 = ¼
LL
a
¼HLb = ¯0
µ
¯1
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
¶2
<
1
9
¯0 = ¼
LL
b
These conditions are reduced to
¯1 ¡ ¯0
9
< ka < ¯1
µ
2¯1 ¡ ¯0
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
¶2
¡ ¯0
9
¯1 ¡ ¯0
9
< kb
¯0
µ
¯1
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
¶2
<
¯0
9
:
To study the conditions for a prisoners’ dilemma, it is su¢cient to consider,
for example, the case ka = kb = k: Without loss of generality examine the case
¯0 = 1; ¯1 = 2: Working out the above conditions, one obtains the condition for
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prisoners’ dilemma 49441 < k <
113
441 : Intuitively, the ¯1¡parameter ought to be
su¢ciently greater than ¯0 to create an incentive to deviate while the cost of
investment, k; ought to be great enough for a reduction of pro…ts if both …rms
adopt the ethical code. We …nally notice that under Cournot competition, the
condition ka = kb = k is not necessary for the prisoners’ dilemma to arise.
Thus,
Proposition 1 Joint adoption of the code for ethical conduct can imply a pris-
oners’ dilemma in duopoly if …rms are pro…t maximizing quantity competitors.
We notice that the prisoners’ dilemma arises in the current context in a
somewhat striking manner. Neither …rm would individualistically prefer to sup-
port the adoption of the ethical code. However, the fear that the rival becomes
the market leader with the help of its outstanding image, creates the …rm an
incentive to adopt the ethical code if only to prevent the destruction of pro…ts.
This result sends a strong message for those arguing that competition per
se automatically leads to deterioration of the corporate ethics. A joint code
for ethical conduct, reducing both …rms’ pro…ts may arise from quantity com-
petition. It remains to be seen whether the result survives when competition
becomes even more intense.
4 Intensi…ed Competition: from Cournot to Bertrand
It was asked by Shleifer whether competition is detrimental to corporate social
responsibility. Shleifer suggested that the observed corporate behavior may be
explained by intensi…ed competition rather than by greed. To explore, suppose
that competition between …rms becomes more intense. We model this change
by a switch from Cournot quantity competition to Bertrand price competition.
Does price competition induce …rms to maximize their pro…ts with no reference
to an ethical conduct?9
When consumers have no ethical aspirations - and this is an empirical ques-
tion whether they have or have not - both …rms can capture the whole market
by undercutting the price of the rival …rm. It is a strong background assumption
in Bertrand price competition theory that a …rm has the ability to serve the full
market as this calls for a fairly large capacity. Suppose, however, that this is
the case. Then, with undi¤erentiated products, the only equilibrium available
is the one where the price is zero. Once consumers value corporate ethics, the
game is di¤erent. If a …rm can adopt an ethical code at zero cost, the ethical
code spreads like an aggressive meme.10 What may prevent the appraisal of
an ethical code as a meme is an opportunity cost, k > 0. The …rm with an
9There are related questions which we will not address in this paper. Does price competition
destroy the credibility of the announced investment k as a signal of the …rm’s type? Does
price competition substantiate the moral hazard incentive for a …rm to deviate from its created
image?
10The idea of a social gene, "meme" in contrast to the biological gene, was introduced by
Dawkins (1976).
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ethical code must be able to charge a positive price to cover the cost while the
…rm with no ethical code tries to undercut that price. Now, consumers’ moral
aspirations can make them pay attention to di¤erences in the …rms’ images.
A mixed equilibrium is possible. To solve, the indi¤erence condition for the
marginal consumer, xm; requires that
pH ¡ pL = (¯1 ¡ ¯0)(1 ¡ xm):
The last consumer, xn; buys at the price
pL = ¯0(1 ¡ (xm + xn)):
Thus, the demand functions are
xm = 1 ¡ pH ¡ pL
¯1 ¡ ¯0
; xn =
pH ¡ pL
¯1 ¡ ¯0
¡ pL
¯0
and the pro…ts are
¼HLa = pH
µ
1 ¡ pH ¡ pL
¯1 ¡ ¯0
¶
¡ ka; ¼HLb = pL
µ
pH ¡ pL
¯1 ¡ ¯0
¡ pL
¯0
¶
:
The Bertrand reaction functions are
µ
1 ¡ pH ¡ pL
¯1 ¡ ¯0
¶
¡pH 1
¯1 ¡ ¯0
= 0;
µ
pH ¡ pL
¯1 ¡ ¯0
¡ pL
¯0
¶
¡pL( 1
¯1 ¡ ¯0
+
1
¯0
) = 0:
We can solve for prices
pH =
2¯1 (¯1 ¡ ¯0)
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
; pL =
¯0 (¯1 ¡ ¯0)
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
(8)
and for the market shares,
xm =
2¯1
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
; xn =
¯1
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
(9)
We obtain
Lemma 2 Under price competition, the …rm with an ethical code will have a
greater market share than the …rm with no ethical code.
Pro…ts satisfy
¼HLa =
4¯21 (¯1 ¡ ¯0)
(4¯1 ¡ ¯0)2
¡ ka
¼HLb =
¯0¯1 (¯1 ¡ ¯0)
(4¯1 ¡ ¯0)2
:
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To constitute an equilibrium, …rms shall not make losses and they have to be
satis…ed with their chosen ethical codes. The H¡…rm has no reason to regret
its type if
ka <
¯1 (¯1 ¡ ¯0)
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
:
For the b¡…rm to abstain from mimicing the a¡…rm, two conditions have
to be met depending on the strategy of the a¡type. Suppose that it chooses
to be the L¡type. Then the b¡…rm will not want to be of the H¡type, either
because kb > ka: Suppose, on the other hand, that both …rms ex ante choose
the H¡type. This means that they commit to costs ka; kb but operate under
similar corporate cultures. As the a¡…rm is more e¢cient, it can undercut the
price of the rival and ultimately make it leave the market. Firm b, on the other
hand, anticipates such an outcome and abstains from adopting the ethical code
in the …rst place. Thus,
Lemma 3 Under cost di¤erences, the market structure where both …rms have
adopted an ethical code is not an equilibrium.
To summarize,
Proposition 4 Under Bertrand competition, we can have a mixed equilibrium
where one …rm adopts the ethical code while the other one does not or, alter-
natively, there is a symmetric equilibrium where neither …rm adopts the ethical
code.
What about prisoners’ dilemma? When neither …rm adopts the ethical code,
their pro…ts must be zero in equilibrium. Thus, price competition cannot lead
to a prisoners’ dilemma as a joint ex ante switch cannot reduce the pro…ts.
Instead, it might increase them.
We have thus demostrated that against the intuition of Shleifer (2004), com-
petition per se need not be detrimental to the adoption of an ethical code. It
is the nature of competition which is decisive. When …rms’ capacity cannot be
built su¢ciently large to cover the whole market and/or competition is of the
Cournot-type, an equilibrium with one or two …rms adopting the ethical code
is possible. It can be of a prisoners’ dilemma type. With price competition, the
outcome is more unsettled. Under cost di¤erences, the market structure where
both …rms have adopted an ethical code is unstable. Moreover, the equilibrium
cannot be of a prisoners’ dilemma type. However, a mixed equilibrium is still
possible. Again thus, competition is not necessarily detrimental to corporate
culture. A strong image among consumers may serve as a competitive advan-
tage rather than disadvantage. Yet, in spite of the optimal choice of corporate
culture of the H¡type …rm, its market share may well fall short of that of its
rival.
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5 Firm Opportunism: moral hazard
5.1 Non-contractable quality
Opportunistic behavior and the moral hazard incentive arises in the context
where a …rm having built a reputation, an image of its ability to operate in a
certain way, …nds it in its interest to deviate. This may be a matter of, say,
product quality, personnel policy or loan default. Frank (2000) has, however,
suggested several mechanisms which may facilitate the commitment. In this
section, we discuss the incentives of a …rm to deviate. The inability of a …rm
to commit to a norm is, of course, anticipated by its customers who will ex
ante adjust their judgement about the …rm accordingly. The problem may
arise because one cannot contract on quality ex ante. Quality is veri…able only
ex post. Having the contract, a …rm can reoptimize its quality particularly if
contracts are incomplete. A time-inconsistency problem may arise.11 Given
that …rms may have di¤erent costs of providing high-quality, high-cost …rms
tend to produce low quality ex post.
In a repeated interaction, the problem is less severe. Suppose for a moment
that the market game is repeated. The …rm a has made its investment k in
the reputation and there is a separating equilibrium in the …rst period with two
types of …rms. With repeated consumer/…rm interaction, it could be pro…table
to invest k though this might be a waste from the short-run perspective. An
option to deviate in the second period might make this investment, however,
worthwhile, provided that the consumers do not anticipate it. Yet, once the
…rm is caught, consumers update their view of the …rm’s type and the …rm is
classi…ed as L for the rest of its life-cycle.
5.2 Firm Image under Disappearing Transparency
To analyze the deviation of a …rm’s image from the true corporate culture, we
introduce two modi…cations of the basic model. First, we assume that the cost
of investment k is a matter of choice for the …rm but unobservable. Second,
we assume that consumer’s valuation of the corporate image is proportional to
their image.
Assume thus that consumers are able to identify the …rm’s type only imper-
fectly. The …rm claims to have invested k but due to the imperfect credibility
of its signal, the consumer downgrades the …rm’s image as
k¤ = ®k + (1 ¡ ®)"; (10)
where 0 < ® < 1 and " is a random variable with probability distribution
function F : R ! [0; 1] and with mean ¹: Parameter ® is a measure of consumer
con…dence in …rm’s information, the accuracy of the signal. Our model in the
previous sections is a special case with ® = 1: Now, k = E[k¤] = ® < 1:
11Especially in non-repeated contracts like renovation projects and other services, the qual-
ity cannot be contracted on, but can only be observed ex post.
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With consumers’ uncertainty of the true ethical stance of the …rm, the image
is downgraded and the net utility of consumers buying at the a¡…rm and,
alternatively, at the b¡…rm is
ui = ¯1k(1 ¡ x) ¡ pH ; vj = ¯0(1 ¡ x) ¡ pL; ¯1 > ¯0 > 0:
The market prices thus satisfy
pL = ¯0(1 ¡ (xm + xn)); pH = ¯1k(1 ¡ xm) ¡ ¯0xn:
The pro…ts are
¼HLa = [¯1k(1 ¡ xm) ¡ ¯0xn]xm ¡ ka; ¼HLb = ¯0(1 ¡ (xm + xn))xn:
The Cournot Nash-equilbrium is restated as
xm =
2¯1k ¡ ¯0
4¯1k ¡ ¯0
> xn =
¯1k
4¯1k ¡ ¯0
: (11)
Prices can be solved as
pH =
¯1k(2¯1k ¡ ¯0)
4¯1k ¡ ¯0
> pL =
¯1k¯0
4¯1k ¡ ¯0
: (12)
Evaluate
@xm
@k
=
2¯1¯0¡
4¯1k ¡ ¯0
¢2 > 0:
Also @pH
@k
> 0: Unsurprisingly, we …nd that increased consumer con…dence
in the …rms’ ethical conduct results in increased market share of an H¡…rm
despite that the …rm asks for a higher price.12
6 Corporate Culture, Labor externality, and Glob-
alization
Happiness studies (Layard (2005)) suggest that being …red or even a threat of
an increase in unemployment in the economy are the major causes of increased
stress and reduced happiness. Status quo is considered as safe. When a …rm
reduces its labor, it faces the problem of damaged public image.
In this section, we integrate productive inputs into the model. We de…ne
the production cost as
c(w; e); (13)
12We work out explicitly only the second stage. We notice that the analysis of the …rms’
game on how much to invest at stage one can be carried out by introducing a variable cost of
investment.
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where w = the wage cost and e = labor e¤ort, satisfying c1 > 0; c2 < 0:13
Consider the case where the required labor e¤ort e is chosen by the …rm. A
worker’s utility is
U = w ¡ e:
To keep the workers on the same welfare level, increased work requirement,
e; ought to be compensated in the wage rate, dU = dw ¡ de = 0. Consider this
as a status quo and call this a fairness equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, it
would be costly to deviate in terms of corporate image. Moreover, if the cost
of production is linearly homogeneous in (w; e); a …rm would not gain a cost
advantage by deviating if the increased work e¤ort is compensated in the wage
level satisfying dU = dw ¡ de = 0:
The essence of the globalization process is that it creates an option for a …rm
to reduce its production cost (instead of going bankrupt). The opportunity cost
of employing in a given high-cost unit is increased as switching production to a
low-cost unit has not only become possible but abstaining from it represents a
competitive disadvantage. If accomplished, such a switch represents a transfer
of income from the high-cost country to the workers of the low-cost country.14 If
not accomplished, the …rm has two possibilities. It can impose a cost reduction
in its current unit. If not feasible, it can demand a greater e¤ort (productivity)
from its labor. This tends to create more pressure on the employees. The
requirements may include extended working time, more work load, the increased
risk of …ring, reduced …rm-…nanced recreation opportunities, etc. Such e¤ects
function like an externality on …rms’ personnel and loss of status quo.
The increased e¤ort requirement on labor is viewed as negative externality
by the general public and it tends to hurt the corporate image. The …rm there-
fore faces the choice of (a) maintaining the status quo and gaining in terms
of image or of (b) demanding a greater working e¤ort with a loss of an image
among consumers. To analyze the market equilibrium, take the wage rate w
as predetermined15 and consider the case where the …rm, having previously a
policy eL; now has an option to choose between (eL; eH); eL < eH :16 Firms’
pro…t function then is
¼ = px ¡ c(w; e):
Consider a local market with two …rms.17 Consider the case where one …rm
becomes an H¡…rm targeting a high image while the other one becomes an
13This cost is like a …xed cost arising from operating the …rm with a …xed labor input.
14The domestic public largely opposes such a change even if it results in an increase in the
earnings of the working labor in the developing countries.
15An alternative though a less realistic way to introduce the external e¤ect would be to
make the wage level fully ‡exible.
16As a historical anecdote, we notice that the "closed-economy" period before the current
wave of globalization has been called an era of "lazy capital". With increased globalization,
…rms face a more intense competition pressure in the open market, and have been trimmed
to the stage of "e¢cient capital", with a more intensive use of their labor input.
17Even when …rms are operating in a globalized world, they can have pricing power arising
from a product brand or from location. In our model, corporate culture is a brand.
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L¡…rm paying no attention to its image. The H¡…rm does not increase worker
stress and is compensated by the consumers with an ethical code. Given the
consumers’ preferences above,
ui = ¯1(1 ¡ xi) ¡ pH ; vj = ¯0(1 ¡ xj) ¡ pL; ¯1 > ¯0 > 0;
the pro…ts are
¼HLa = [¯1(1¡xm)¡¯0xn]xm¡c(w; eL); ¼HLb = ¯0(1¡(xm+xn))xn¡c(w; eH):
This model can be analyzed within the framework developed in the earlier
part of the paper. The L¡…rm will acquire a competitive advantage as its cost is
lower. However, the H¡…rm may be able to keep its market share depending on
the consumers’ ability to commit to appreciate the H¡…rm’s corporate culture.
With Cournot competition, pro…ts can be calculated as above:
¼HLa = ¯1
µ
2¯1 ¡ ¯0
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
¶2
¡ c(w; eL); ¼HLb = ¯0
µ
¯1
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
¶2
¡ c(w; eH):
If also the a¡…rm abstains from targeting a superior image, pro…ts are
¼LLa = ¼
LL
b =
1
9
¯0 ¡ c(w; eH):
Does the consumers’ valuation of corporate image help to sustain an equi-
librium where one …rm abstains from increased working e¤ort? The necessary
condition for ¼HLa > ¼
LL
a is
¯1
µ
2¯1 ¡ ¯0
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
¶2
> c(w; eL) ¡ c(w; eH): (14)
This amounts to stating that the corporate revenue has to exceed the foregone
cost saving. Now, because
@
@¯1
"
¯1
µ
2¯1 ¡ ¯0
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
¶2#
> 0;
increased consumer con…dence on the …rm’s image helps to maintain a corpo-
rate culture where the …rm avoids an employment policy which causes negative
externality on its labor force. Markets can provide the control. The a¡…rm can
gain by building an image of a …rm with an ethical code. This conclusion is
conditional on that the b¡…rm does not challenge the image of the a¡…rm with
the same strategy of image building. Indeed, it might.
Thus, consider the case where both …rms maintain their inherited e¤ort
requirement eL with pro…ts
¼HHa = [¯1(1 ¡ (xa + xb)) ¡ p]xa ¡ c(w; eL)
¼HHb = [¯1(1 ¡ (xa + xb)) ¡ p]xb ¡ c(w; eL)
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The reaction functions are those derived in section 2.1.2 and the outputs can be
solved as
xa =
1
3
= xb:
Solve for the market price,
p =
1
3
¯1;
When both …rms have adopted the ethical code, the ethical aspiration of con-
sumers again does not have any impact on how many consumers actually buy.
From another angle, the …rms can exploit the consumers’ willingness to pay for
their ethical image with the pro…t levels
¼HHa =
1
9
¯1 ¡ c(w; eL); ¼HHb =
1
9
¯1 ¡ c(w; eL):
A necessary (but not su¢cient) condition for the case HH to constitute a market
equilibrium is that
c(w; eL) · 1
9
¯1
which does not depend on the basic willingness to pay ¯0: When this condition is
satis…ed, we can have two …rms with a code of an ethical conduct, which leave
unexploited the option to demand more pressure from their workers and yet
making a positive pro…t. When both …rms can commit to an ethical conduct,
consumers pay a lower price than the price paid by the buyers of the …rm with
an ethical conduct in the mixed equilibrium. We, however, expect a mixed
equilibrium to arise if one of the …rms is superior in managing production costs
without a labor externality.
What is the economics behind these outcomes? The idea that …rms may ab-
stain from exploiting their workers even when the cost is high relative to workers’
productivity necessitates a particular social awareness among the members of
the society. In a sense, the argument necessitates that there is a social trade-o¤
between the conscience of consumers and the externality on workers. No more,
no less, a corporate culture can operate as a middleman for the emergence of
such an altruism. Ultimately, it is an empirical question to what extent such
interpersonal transfers exist in a particular economy.
7 On Socially Optimal Corporate Culture
The society shares the interest on …rms for two reasons. The …rst reason is that
the society expects a return on its investment in public goods. Firms cannot
make pro…ts to their owners unless the society provides the required public goods
in terms of institutions, infrastructure, and contract enforcement principles.18
The society is implicitly subsidizing production by creating these institutions.
18We can contrast an organizeed society with a jungle economy, described by Golding (1954).
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Such public goods need resources to be …nanced. Firms are expected to return
money to the society in the spirit of reciprocity and bene…t taxation. In what
follows, we abstract from taxes and focus on the second reason.
The second platform where the interests of corporations and the society meet
is in the creation and maintenance of social norms. In an individualistic society,
it is appropriate to de…ne the intangible social capital in terms of prevailing
consumer preferences for ethical code. Consumers value the ethical code in the
same way, as they value an organized society with social norms supporting trust
and facilitating cooperation. In our model, the reservation price of consumer xi
is given by ¯0(1 ¡ xi); measuring how much the consumer values the product.
The valuation of the corporate culture that …rms have adopted is valued by
him as (¯1 ¡ ¯0) (1 ¡ xi). Therefore, we can interpret the increased consumer
surplus, the valuation exceeding ¯0 as social capital, say K:
We have three solutions for the social capital, say K0;K1; K2 depending on
how many of the …rms make the investment, k: We notice that the solution for
the social capital di¤ers in the case where markets are organized in terms of
Bertrand competition instead of Cournot-competition. We focus here on the
Cournot case. Let x denote the total number of buyers from the …rm(s) which
have adopted the code of ethical conduct. The increase in consumer satisfaction
in terms of greater consumer surplus created by such corporate culture can be
evaluated as
K(x) = (¯1 ¡ ¯0)
·
1
2
x2 + (1 ¡ x)x
¸
:
In the LL¡equilibrium, x = 0; hence K(0) = 0: In the HL¡ equilibrium,
x = xm =
2¯1 ¡ ¯0
4¯1 ¡ ¯0
;
while in the HH¡equilibrium, x = 23 : Consider an example. Take ¯0 =
1; ¯1 = 2: Then in the HL¡equilibrium, the price is pH = 0:85 while in the
HH¡equilibrium it is pH = 0:66: We can then verify that the increase in the
consumer surplus is greater in the latter case. Indeed, K(1) = 0:34; K(2) = 0:44:
Social capital is but one dimension of social gain from the ethical code. The
other one is represented by the bene…ciaries’ utility. Consider the model of the
previous section. Firms can contribute to the creation of social capital by intro-
ducing corporate culture which matches consumers’ intrinsic moral valuations.
Social capital is an intangible capital which in the model of section 6 thus arises
from …rms’ labor policy: Abstaining from harsh labor measures, the …rm loses
the available cost e¢ciency but the society gains by the augmented wellbeing
of labor. When one …rm changes the employment policy, social welfare declines
by ¢U = ¡(eH ¡ eL):
If a utilitarian planner could choose the ethical code of …rms, what would
he choose, given that the social cost of having an ethical code is positive? In
an individualistic society where individual preferences are the starting point for
social valuation, we obtain welfare measures W0; W1; W2 in terms of the amount
of …rms with an ethical conduct (0; 1; 2);
19
W0 = 2[c(w; eH) ¡ c(w; eL)] ¡ 2(eH ¡ eL)
W1 = K1 + c(w; eH) ¡ c(w; eL) ¡ (eH ¡ eL) (15)
W2 = K2:
Optimality of two ethical …rms instead of just one requires thus that
K2 ¡ K1 > c(w; eH) ¡ c(w; eL) ¡ (eH ¡ eL);
while one ethical …rm instead of none requires
K1 > c(w; eH) ¡ c(w; eL) ¡ (eH ¡ eL):
We hence have well-de…ned conditions on the desired structure of the ethical
market. Ask next: do market forces create su¢ciently social capital? For the
purposes of the current paper, it is su¢cient to put this issue in a perspective.
In terms of our modelling framework, we can identify two potential sources of
market failures. First, there is moral hazard if the corporate image and the true
corporate culture can di¤er. Informational asymmetry, as to whether the …rm
has committed to its announced values by its investment, is a potential reason
for a market failure. Second, changes in environment can create losses which
can be regarded as externalities. In terms of our model above, workers tend to
su¤er from intensi…ed competition. We think that it is useful just to state these
issues without aiming at any policy proposals in the current paper.
8 Final Remarks
Should …rms focus on pro…t maximization or should they pay attention to stake-
holders’ interests, too? Our paper points to the view that the question appears
misstated. Assuming throughout the paper that …rms are pro…t maximizers,
we have shown that markets yet can make …rms both to adopt the ethical code
and to pay attention to the well-being of their stakeholders. The paper has not
challenged Friedman’s answer to the normative question of what …rms should
be doing. It has, however, addressed the issue of whether the moral values of
consumers can shape the strategies of the …rms. We have examined industry
equilibria where some or all …rms adopt the code of ethical conduct, despite the
fact that they are maximizing their pro…t. This suggests that having an ethical
conduct can be a comparative advantage in market competition.
We have demonstrated that, contrary to the intuition of Shleifer (2004),
competition per se need not be detrimental to the adoption of an ethical code.
It is the nature of competition which is decisive. When …rms’ capacity cannot
be built su¢ciently large to cover the whole market and competition is of the
Cournot-type, an equilibrium with one or two …rms adopting the ethical code
is possible. It can even be of a prisoners’ dilemma type. With price competi-
tion, the outcome is more unsettled. Then under cost di¤erences, the market
structure where both …rms have adopted an ethical code is not an equilibrium.
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Moreover, a prisoners’ dilemma type of outcome cannot arise. However, a mixed
equilibrium is still possible. Again, competition is thus not necessarily detri-
mental to corporate culture. A strong image among consumers may serve as a
competitive advantage rather than disadvantage. Disappearing transparency is,
however, a serious threat in the absence of a credible commitment. The issue of
globalization with international redistribution of production and income and is
a more complex one than typically suggested. Again, consumers could have a
role which has not been previously identi…ed. Finally, we hint that the socially
optimal corporate culture probably cannot be produced by the market forces
alone. Yet, it does not remain fully open what is needed for greater social re-
sponsibility by …rms: improved communication world-wide and increased social
awareness by consumers. It is not unplausible that the development takes this
route.
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